Juridica

Dear Reader,

Raul Narits — 2025-05-07 23:22:59

Dear Reader

Restricting the Electorate in City and Municipal Council Elections

Vallo Olle — 2025-05-08 16:14:29

In recent years, several legislative drafts have been submitted aiming to restrict the group of eligible voters in local government council elections. The initiators of these considered it possible to impose such a restriction on a fundamental right without amending the Constitution. Some drafts sought to exclude Russian and Belarusian citizens from voting rights, others added stateless persons to that list. Certain proposals retained voting rights not only for Estonian and other EU citizens but also for citizens of NATO member states, among others. Ultimately, however, a different decision was made. On 26 March 2025, the circle of eligible voters was restricted through an amendment to the Constitution.

Publicly, the goals of the amendment have been cited as ensuring national security, as well as moral considerations asserting that citizens of aggressor states should not exercise any political rights in Estonia. On the other hand, some have pointed out that this may also serve to reshape the electorate in a way that benefits certain political parties.

The core legal question has been whether such an amendment could have been made without amending the Constitution, namely, through the Municipal Council Election Act. In this article, the author aims to show that the Constitutional Assembly of Estonia deliberately decided that all permanent residents should have the right to vote in city and municipal council elections. Subsection 156 (2) of the Constitution was formulated in the Assembly in such a way that the age or citizenship requirements could not be introduced by election law alone. Now that the restriction has been enacted through a constitutional amendment, a separate issue arises: how this change aligns with the letter and spirit of the Constitution.

Restriction of Immovable Owner’s Rights Due to Another Person’s Economic Interests

Priit Kama, Christina Kiik, Daniel Moppel — 2025-05-08 16:16:52

A principle is established in accordance with subsection 68 (2) under which the rights of an owner may only be restricted by law or the rights of other persons. In essence, this provision echoes § 32 of the Constitution, according to which restrictions on property ownership must be prescribed by law. The Supreme Court has emphasised that every owner fundamentally has the right to possess and use their property at their own discretion, and their rights may only be limited by the rights of other owners or persons or by general public interests. This means that the right of ownership may be restricted on both private and public law grounds.

In judicial practice, it is often the case that the economic interests of a non-owner with an interest in the real estate are weighed against those of the owner, frequently treating the owner and the non-owner on nearly equal footing. In today’s mainstream politics and public discourse, a society centred on private property is, at least rhetorically, rarely questioned. However, certain elements borrowed from various ideologies and foreign models, where private ownership may no longer be seen in the same central role, have been introduced into this perspective.

This article focuses specifically on the restriction of an immovable owner’s rights due to private interests, leaving aside extensive public law restrictions.

Apartment Owner’s Claim for Damages Against the Apartment Association. Supreme Court Decision in Civil Case 2-18-13649 and Subsequent Case Law

Tambet Tampuu — 2025-05-08 16:32:54

On 19 March 2021, the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court issued a decision in civil case 2-18-13649, where in paragraphs 18 and 19 it addressed the possibility of claiming damages in a situation where the owner of an apartment ownership has suffered harm due to a detrimental impact arising from a common ownership object. The Supreme Court found that, based on subsection 12 (2) of the Apartment Ownership and Apartment Associations Act as well as the second sentence of subsection 72 (5) and subsection 75 (1) of the Law of Property Act, an apartment owner whose object of exclusive ownership or exclusively used part of the common ownership object has sustained damage may claim compensation from the other apartment owners via the apartment association, provided that the damage is not due to a breach of obligation by a specific apartment owner or by the apartment association.

The claim for damages outlined in paragraphs 18 and 19 of the Chamber’s decision represents a novel approach, as it is not classified under § 115 (and following) of the Law of Obligations Act. This means that for the obligation to compensate damages to arise, it is not necessary to prove that the apartment association breached its obligations or that such a breach caused the damage. Since determining whether there was a breach of obligation is not relevant in this type of claim, the question of whether the breach was excusable (under subsections 103 (1) and (2) of the Law of Obligations Act) does not arise either.

The author of this article reviewed final judgments of county courts and circuit courts of appeal that referenced the Chamber’s decision and the two aforementioned orders of the Supreme Court. The author aimed to determine whether the parties and the courts correctly understood paragraph 18 of the Chamber’s decision and whether the courts have taken inspiration from the approach outlined therein.

Does the Principle of Responsible Insurance Exist in Insurance Law?

Olavi-Jüri Luik, Kadi Saluste — 2025-05-09 15:42:46

Insurance distributors, namely insurers, insurance brokers, and insurance agents, are obliged to determine the policyholder’s insurance interest and requirements for the insurance contract based on the information provided by the policyholder. They must recommend, from among the offered insurance contracts, the one that best meets the policyholder’s interests and requirements. Additionally, they are required to provide the policyholder with sufficient explanations, in line with the complexity of the insurance contract and the type of policyholder, so that the policyholder can make an informed decision about entering into the insurance contract. Essentially, the insurance distributor has a duty to identify the policyholder’s insurance needs. In accordance with subsection 221 (2) of the Insurance Activities Act, this duty to identify the insurance need does not apply to the insurer when the insurance contract is concluded through an insurance broker (in such cases, the obligation lies with the broker) or in cases involving the so-called large risks.

Based on the above, the authors analyse how far the insurance distributor’s obligation extends to assisting the policyholder in making an informed insurance decision, specifically, whether the principle of responsible insurance exists in insurance law and whether (and to what extent) the insurer, insurance broker, and insurance agent are liable in the event of a breach of that duty.

The Controversial Admissibility of the Innovatively American ANOM Evidence in Estonian Criminal Proceedings. Supreme Court Decision of 16 January 2025 in Criminal Case 1-21-7384 (with the Concurring Opinions of Two Supreme Court Judges)

Eerik Kergandberg — 2025-05-12 00:18:28

In accordance with subsection 65 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as a general rule, evidence collected in a foreign country according to the laws of that country is admissible in Estonian criminal proceedings, provided that the procedural operation undertaken to obtain the evidence does not violate the principles of Estonian criminal procedure. The central question of this article is whether (or to what extent) the requirements of subsection 65 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure were adhered to in the present case. In other words: how convincingly is it justified in the judgment that (a) the encrypted messaging data from the ANOM communication application (hereinafter: ANOM evidence) received as a result of a U.S. mutual legal assistance request was collected in full compliance with U.S. law, and (b) the procedural action used to obtain the ANOM evidence was not in conflict with the principles of Estonian criminal proceedings?

The Supreme Court held that, due to state sovereignty, Estonian courts, when applying subsection 65 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, are not competent to assess whether a foreign state complied with its own laws during evidence collection, and that such jurisdiction rests solely with the country that gathered the evidence. Therefore, when applying subsection 65 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the presumption of legality must apply, meaning that evidence obtained from a foreign country is presumed to have been collected in accordance with the laws of that country. Furthermore, the Supreme Court categorically refused to recognise subsection 1261 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure as an expression of the principles of Estonian criminal proceedings in the context of subsection 65 (1). The latter norm stipulates that information obtained by means of a covert operation constitutes evidence, provided the requirements of the law have been observed when applying for authorisation for the operation, when granting the authorisation, and when conducting the operation. The author counters these positions, and also analyses and compares the concurring opinions attached to the judgment.

Lessons from the 1930s for Estonian Statehood

Rait Maruste — 2025-05-12 00:34:51

History is not merely a subject of study, but also a constitutional textbook for the present, aimed at raising awareness of past mistakes and preventing new ones. This argument is especially relevant when the general timeline spans only a century, with half of that period spent without independence, and the circumstances in our neighbouring regions have not changed much in substance.

The Constitution and the laws associated with it are just words on paper as long as they are not supported by the security network of a politically conscious free people and independent, professional, and impartial institutions that form part of the democratic state structure. This article aims to focus primarily on why and how the events that took place in Estonia in the 1930s, as well as the 1940 fiasco, became possible. What were or could have been the internal/constitutional aspects that allowed this and what factors should have, if not completely prevented such a development, at least made it as difficult as possible?

The author argues that a combination of factors led to the coup d'état of 12 March 1934, the establishment of autocracy, the dissolution of the Vaps Movement, and the subsequent silent submission. The most significant factors influencing this were the political and economic situation in Europe, Russia, and Estonia, the political maturity of the Estonian people in governing the state, the background and awareness of the political elite concerning democratic governance, as well as the ambition of the state leader, Konstantin Päts, and his close associates (Johan Laidoner, Kaarel Eenpalu). Additionally, the weakness and unreliability of the justice system and law enforcement, particularly internal and external intelligence, played a key role. The article focuses on the extent to which the developments of that time were influenced by the interests of our neighbouring country, its indirect interference, and the hidden and skilful manipulation of events.