Juridica

Robot Judge: Science Fiction Film or the Foreseeable Future?

Karl Joonas Kendla — 2024-10-24 15:27:03

The idea of a computer replacing a human judge may have seemed utopian just a few years ago, but the time has come to talk about robot judges not in conditional but in definitive terms. Many artificial intelligence (AI) systems are used in courts today, with the most advanced ones being capable of automatically generating credible court judgments. Although no machine currently administers justice without human supervision, recent achievements indicate that it should come as no surprise if one day it is not human eyes, but dull computer screens that peek out from under the judges’ robes. Even the Supreme Court has left the door open to robot judges, stating that while the use of technology in the exercise of state power must meet all the requirements of applicable law, the direct involvement of a human being is not necessarily required to fulfil this condition.

At the same time, there are considerable risks associated with using AI in the administration of justice, as evidenced by the fact that the AI Act classifies AI systems intended for the administration of justice as high-risk AI systems. Thus, the impact of AI on the administration of justice and the role of the judges needs to be assessed at an early stage. Otherwise, the legal order may stifle innovation or, even worse, the rights of individuals may be violated.

Since a robot judge adjudicates in a fully automated way, without any human input, and thus replaces the judge, the key question in the implementation of robot judges is whether AI systems may adjudicate in place of a judge; this is a question concerning the monopoly of the administration of justice, i.e. who has the competence to administer justice. Consequently, the aim of this article is to answer the question to what extent is the use of a robot judge (i.e. an AI system that autonomously adjudicates on civil cases) in civil proceedings compatible with the principle of the monopoly of the administration of justice, one of the most important requirements of adjudication.

AI and Non-Contractual Liability: Will the Insurance System Replace the Tort System in the Future? The Example of Autonomous Vehicles

Olavi-Jüri Luik, Rauno Kinkar — 2024-10-24 15:27:22

The Member States of the European Union are subject to compulsory motor vehicle insurance, which has been harmonised between Member States by Directive 2009/103/EC of 16 September 2009 and amended by Directive 2021/2118 of 24 November 2021 (hereinafter together: MID). The application of the MID principles to compensation for damage caused by autonomous and fully autonomous vehicles raises a number of new questions, which the authors hereby analyse.

Whether and if so, how does the hedging of liability arising primarily from the use of fully autonomous vehicles differ through the insurance system and the liability arising from the use of non-autonomous vehicles in the context of MID?

If there is a difference (i.e. the liability arising from the use of autonomous or fully autonomous vehicles is different or broader), could the corresponding broader liability be mitigated through another insurance system?

If the extent of liability cannot be mitigated through another insurance system, or if it is not practical, would the pan-European motor vehicle insurance system need to be changed (if so, how)?

The authors analyse the different approaches that legal scholars have proposed in this context. In doing so, the study is limited to land vehicles only.

The Crypto Assets in Estonian Enforcement Proceedings

Vladislav Linko, Daniel Moppel — 2024-10-24 15:27:41

Crypto-assets are technologically decentralized and anonymous, making them difficult to monitor and regulate. The explosive growth of crypto-assets brings new challenges for lawyers. It is possible to store crypto-assets without intermediaries, but mostly service providers are used, with whom the assets are stored. In enforcement proceedings, the enforcement agent may need to enforce decisions related to crypto-assets or seize and sell crypto-assets. The enforceable title concerning crypto-assets must take into account the technical characteristics of crypto-assets and the risks specific to the field. Upon enforcement it is important to secure the private key related to the hardware crypto-asset wallet, as there is otherwise significant risk of unauthorized transfer of the crypto-assets. To identify crypto-assets belonging to a debtor, it is possible to approach third parties and there are mechanisms in place to allow enforcement agents access to this information. As part of the enforcement procedure, one must take into account the possibility that the number of debtors owning crypto-assets is increasing and different measures must be implemented to find hidden crypto-assets. In this way, it is necessary for enforcement agents to acquire the competence of handling, evaluating and organizing auctions with crypto-assets, because the probability of coming into contact with crypto-assets in one way or another increases over time.

Legal Framework for Flying Drones in Special Airspace: The Establishment of the U-Space Airspace in Estonia

Madlenne Timofejev — 2024-10-24 15:28:04

One of the most important legal challenges in modern aviation lies in the air traffic management of unmanned aerial vehicle systems. The current air traffic management system is designed for manned aviation, without taking into account the addition of drones to the airspace. The problem is compounded by the fact that the current aviation system is already under an increasing burden, managing an ever larger flow of traffic and approaching its maximum capacity limit. As a result, it will be difficult to integrate drones, the market for which is expected to grow drastically in the coming years, into the current flight management system.

In light of the above, the European Commission has taken steps to manage the air traffic of drones. In particular with the development of the U-space Regulation, which will allow for the creation of separate airspace for drones. Although the U-space Regulation and the regulations supporting it entered into force on 26 January 2023, Estonia has not yet started to implement them. As the Regulation has not yet been transposed into national law, the state and the unmanned aircraft sector face a number of legal concerns. In particular, questions arise in relation to the establishment of the U-space airspace.

The article analyses the problem areas related to the definition and establishment of the U-space airspace and whether the U-space airspace can be created in Estonia on the basis of the current aviation law or whether a separate legal framework is needed for this.

The Amendment of the Author’s and Performer’s Contract and Guarantee of This Right Through the Notification Obligation

Elvi Tuisk — 2024-10-24 15:28:24

Copyright is part of the field of intellectual property, which is largely regulated by European Union legislation. One such piece of legislation is the DSM Directive, which entered into force on 7 June 2019 and was part of the copyright reform package published by the European Commission in September 2016. The aim of the reform package was, among other things, to ensure a fair market for authors and performers.

In order to strengthen the position of authors and performers in negotiations with contractual partners and to ensure that they receive fair remuneration for the use of their works and performances, Chapter 3 of the DSM Directive was created, which contains five measures to achieve the respective objectives. Each measure is intended either to directly ensure that an author or performer receives appropriate remuneration for the use of their work or performance, or to provide for a mechanism for cancelling a contract which does not give rise to appropriate remuneration. They have been transposed into Estonian law since January 2022 by Sections 49¹–49⁴ of the Copyright Act. The main measure to ensure fair and proportionate remuneration is the right to amend the contract, since it is with this that authors and performers can improve their position without cancelling the contract. It has been transposed into Estonian law by Section 49² of the Copyright Act. Article 18 of the DSM Directive, that is to say, the principle of appropriate and proportionate remuneration of authors and performers, is closely linked to this, since the contract adjustment mechanism must ensure that authors and performers receive remuneration in any event in accordance with Article 18. The obligation to provide information laid down in Article 19 of the Directive and transposed by Section 49¹ of the Copyright Act is also closely linked to the right to amend the contract, since, in order to amend the contract, the author and performer must have sufficient information to assess whether there are sufficient grounds for doing so. If the author or performer remains in the dark without the possibility of requesting the necessary information, the right to amend the contract becomes meaningless, as they are unable to prove the existence of a basis for amending the contract.

The Confrontation Between the Limitation of a Claim and the Principle of Good Faith. When Could the Limitation Period Not Apply?

Annegret Reisi — 2024-10-24 15:28:45

It is not irregular that a creditor may file a claim after the expiry of the limitation period. Once the limitation period has expired, the debtor may refuse to perform the obligation. That is the legal consequence of the application of the expiry of the limitation period.

However, the expiry of the limitation period of a claim may not necessarily provide the debtor with the right to refuse to perform the obligation. In some cases, the principle of good faith may prevail over the legal certainty that usually comes with the expiry of the limitation period. To be more specific, the application of the expiry of the limitation period may be impermissible on the basis of the principle of good faith. The Supreme Court of Estonia has repeatedly referred to such solution in its case-law. Yet, it should be emphasized that declaring the expiry of the limitation period inapplicable is an exceptional solution and shall therefore arise rarely. This article focuses on such exceptional situations.

The main purpose of this article is to identify the fundamental and general guidelines that justify the inapplication of the expiry of the limitation period. Also, the aim is to understand why the application of the expiry of the limitation period may be unacceptable. This article relies mostly on Estonian law and case-law. Since the legal basis for the non-application of the expiry of the limitation period (i.e. the principle of good faith) is based on German and Dutch law, then some essential references to German and Dutch law are also made. As for the specific cases regarding the question of the non-application of the expiry of the limitation period, the case-law of the Supreme Court of Estonia is analysed to illustrate such exceptional cases and fulfil the purpose of this article.

Proposed Changes to Pre-Trial Criminal Proceedings: Threat to Equality of the Parties and Fair Administration of Justice

Kaire Hänilene — 2024-10-24 15:29:03

On 3 July 2024, the Ministry of Justice sent for approval the draft Code of Criminal Procedure, the draft State Fees Act, and the draft Act amending the State-funded Legal Aid Act (making court proceedings more expedient). The explanatory memorandum to the draft Act identifies the need to optimise court proceedings as the reason for amending the Code of Criminal Procedure. According to the explanatory memorandum, the draft Act focuses on the subject of pre-trial proceedings only to the extent that it is indispensable for optimising court proceedings.

To the extent that the summarised title of the draft Act is ‘making court proceedings more expedient’, the proposed changes to the pre-trial proceedings may go unnoticed. In the opinion of the author, the reasoning behind the explanatory memorandum diverges from the situation experienced in the daily work process, and in the proposed changes the accusing party is disproportionately preferred. Moving away from the principle of equality of arms should not take place in the balanced law-making of the rule of law, nor in the administration of justice governed by it.

The author mainly dwells on important changes concerning the pre-trial proceedings. According to the draft Act, the aim is to restrict the right of appeal of investigations, to reduce the protection of the rights of persons affected by criminal proceedings, and to waive the obligation to substantiate the orders of the investigating authority, the prosecutor’s office, and the court. As a result of such changes, it is not possible to optimise the court proceedings in any way, but they do have a very real negative effect in terms of reaching a fair decision in the criminal case.