Summary

On 29 May 2013, half a year passed from the coming into force of the Administrative Law Chamber of the Supreme Court 29 November 2012 decision No. 3-3-1-29-12 (hereinafter: Villa Benita judgment). The chamber somewhat displaced several earlier positions with this decision. For instance, while in the past it was persistently emphasised that clear expression of considerations in the reasons of an administrative act was essential not only for the judicial control of the act but also for the general legitimatisation of same, in the Villa Benita judgment it was for the first time written expressis verbis that it was possible for a court, in reviewing a discretional administrative act, to consider under certain circumstances the reasons given by the administrative body only in the course of the court procedure.

The authors believe that six months is a suitable period to search for the first manifestations of the effect of the Supreme Court case law. The article reviews the Villa Benita judgment and analyses the ways this judgment has been interpreted and used in court practice: Has it been treated as a U-turn from the previous positions of the Supreme Court or as a marginal exception that does not devalue the past practices. The authors focus mainly on the procedural law aspects of the judgment, as this is where the news value of the decision was.

The Villa Benita case was referred to the full composition of the administrative chamber, and two justices held dissenting opinions in the case. The authors also touch upon these dissenting opinions and point out the hazards which any far-reaching interpretation of the decision imposes.